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ABSTRACT 
The  impacts of reducing both agricultural and  nonagricultural protection on 
the agricultural sector are assessed with emphasis placed on Argentina, 
Brazil,  and  Mexico.  By  modeling  simultaneously all goods  sectors of the 
economy  in a  multi-country framework,  we  evaluate the  importance of  (1)  the 
relative rates of protection between sectors and  (2)  exchange rate adjustments 
that follow trade liberalization in a  world of floating rates.  We  find 
substantial improvements  in net agricultural trade for  Argentina and  Brazil, 
particularly following  a  multilateral trade and  exchange rate liberalization. 
Additionally.  the value of gross domestic product  improves  for all three 
countries  following multilateral liberalization suggesting that these 
countries experience gains  in standard of  living from  lower world protection. 
Xeywords:  trade  liberalization,  protection,  exchange rates,  simulation model, 
Argentina.  Brazil, Mexico 
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Brazil.  and  Mexico. THE  EFFECT  OF  PROTECTION  AHD  EXCHANGE  RATE  POLICIES  ON 
AGRICULTURAL  THADE: 
Implications for Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Mexico 
IBTRODUCTIOH 
A central theme  of the World  Bank's World  Development  Report 1986  is that 
agricultural policies must  be considered in conjunction with macroeconomic 
policies in order to assess their impacts  on  the agricultural sector.  Both 
developed  and  developing nations'  governments  employ  a  large array of policy 
instruments--macro and  sector-specific--which affect agricultural production, 
consumption,  trade and  prices.  Agricultural policies include export subsidies 
and  taxes,  import tariff and  nontariff barriers,  income  payments,  price 
supports,  input and  credit subsidies,  and  the activities of state trading  and 
marketing boards.  Macroeconomic  policies that influence agricultural 
production,  consumption,  and  trade--through their impacts  on  relative prices 
of exports  and  imports  {or of tradeables  and  non-tradeables)--include 
monetary,  fiscal,  and  exchange  rate policies.  An  overvalued exchange rate, 
for example,  is an implicit tax on  agricultural exports and  an implicit 
subsidy on  agricultural imports.  Thus,  exchange  rate policies can reinforce 
or counteract sector-specific policies. 
A related issue concerns  the structure of protection between agriculture and 
other sectors of the economy.  aelative rate. of protection influence relative 
price. between agricultural and  nonagricultural goods  and,  thereby,  resource 
flows,  employment  levels in agriculture versus other sectors,  the distribution 
1 of  income  between asriculture and  other sectors,  and  the relative importance 
of asriculture in earnins foreign exchanse.  In developing countries, 
protection of the nonagricultural-sector has  tended to be higher  than 
asricultural protection (protection of agriculture is often negative), 
suggesting that the nonagriculture sector policies tax agricultural producers 
(ERS,  1987). 
The  major objective of this study is to assess the interaction of agricultural 
protection, nonagricultural protection and  exchange rate policies  in 
Argentina,  Brazil and  Mexico  by contrasting the  impacts of agricultural 
liberalization with economy-wide  liberalization.  Tbe  focus  is on  the 
implications of  liberalization for these countries'  roles  in agricultural 
trade.  We  simulate the  impacts of alternative liberalization scenarios on 
prices,  consumption,  production and  international trade of agricultural soods, 
the balance of  trade.  gross domestic product.  and  exchange rate values  from 
the perspectives of  these three countries.  A Static WOrld  Policy SIMulation 
framework  (SWOPSIH)  (Roningen 1986)  is used  for the analysis.  It includes 
eight countries/regions  (United States,  European Community,  Japan,  Canada, 
Argentina,  Brazil,  Mexico,  and  rest-of-world  (ROW»,  nine  as~icultural soods, 
a  composite nonagricultural traded good,  and  a  composite nontraded sood.  A 
base level  (1984)  is established for demand  and  supply,  consumer prices, 
J  .' 
producer prices,  and  world prices at market exchange rates.  For each country, 
producer and  consumer prices  (or the implicit per unit values of production 
and  consumption)  deviate from  world price depending  on  the level of 
protection.  The  level of sovernment  intervention in agriculture is measured 
by producer and  consumer  subsidy equivalents  (ERS.  1987).  For nonasricultural 
soods,  ad  valorem tariff and nontariff rates are u.ed for protection measures 
(Whalley.  1985  and  International Konetary Fund,  1986). 
2 The  model  developed  in the paper is a  "more  complete" partial equilibrium 
model  than in other studies  (Tyers  and  Anderson,  1986  and  Roningen,  SUllivan, 
and  Wainio,  1987)  in the sense tbat all goods  are specified in demand  and 
supply functions.  It falls short of a  general equilibrium characterization 
lince factor markets  are not explicitly described.  Our  approach has the 
advantage  over agricultural sector models  of accounting for feedback  from  one 
sector to another as relative prices alter.  Additionally,  because all goods 
in the economy  are accounted for and,  hence,  the total balance of trade,  the 
exchange rate can be modeled  endogenously and  the effect of floating rates  (or 
exchange rate liberalization)  can be evaluated. 
The  results of five alternative model  simulations are presented,  including 
three trilateral (Argentina,  Brazil,  and Mexico)  liberalization scenarios  and 
two  multilateral  (world)  liberalization scenarios: 
(1)  trilateral liberalization of the agricultural sectors with fixed 
exchange rates; 
(2)  trilateral liberalization of the agricultural and  nonagricultural 
sectors with fixed  exchange rates; 
(3)  trilateral liberalization of the agricultural and  nonagricultural 
sectors with endogenous  (or flexible)  exchange  rates for all countries/regions 
in the model; 
! 
(4)  multilateral  (world)  liberalization of the agricultural sectors with 
fixed exchange ratesi  and 
(5)  multilateral liberalization of the agricultural and nonagricultural 
sectors with flexible exchange rates. 
Before presenting the analytical framework  and  simulation results,  we  provide 
background  information on  the agricultural,  trade,  and  exchange rate policies 
of the three Latin American  countries. 
3 PROTECTION  ABO  EXCHANGE  RATE  POLICIES  IN  ARGE~tNA. BlAZtL  ABO  MEXICO 
This  section briefly reviews  the agricultural sectors of Argentina,  Brazil. 
and  Mexico--their roles  in these economies  and  the factors  that have affected 
their performances.  Although there are strong similarities in the economic 
profiles of these countries.  there are also some  important differences  in the 
agricultural policy pictures. 
Arsentina 
Argentina is one  of the world's  largest agricultural exporters,  particularly 
of grains and  oilseeds.  Agriculture is a  major contributor to the country's 
GOP  (13  percent),  export earnings,  and  public revenues used to finance 
industrialization.  Despite the still major role that Argentina's agriculture 
plays.  this role has declined over the last several decades.  For example, 
agriculture accounted  for 90  percent of export earnings during the 1940's.  but 
for  75  percent in the eighties  (Mielke).  Between  1965  and  1983.  agricultural 
growth  averaged only 0.8 percent a  year,  compared  with 1.9 percent a  year 
during 1950-64.  and  even higher levels  in the  lates forties  (World  Bank 
Development  Report.  1986). 
The  roots of agriculture's recent performance are traced by  some  authors  to  a 
number  of policies biased asainst asriculture.  Agricultural prices have been 
kept  low  relative to world prices via several policy mechanisms:  taxes  and 
tariffs on  agricultural exports,  quantitative restrictions on  exports,  price 
controls,  and  credit rationing  (Cavallo  and  Hundlak.  1982).  Exchange  rate 
contols.  combined  with high sovernment expenditures oriented mainly toward 
nontraded soods,  led to an overvalued currency Which  implicitly taxed 
producers  of traded agricultural goods.  Periods of exceptionally lar&e 
deviations between nominal  and equilibrium rates of exchange  occurred during 
the second halves of the fifties and  sixties and  most of the seventies 
4 (Hielke,  1984).  MUltiple exchange rates have also been used  to extract 
government  revenues  from agricultural export sales. 
Producers of nonagricultural traded goods,.thou&h implicitly taxed  through the 
exchange rates policies,  received price.supports through import tariff 
protection.  Protection of the nonagricultural sector was,  therefore,  an 
additional source of  implicit taxation of agriculture (Cavallo and  Hundlak, 
1982). 
In Hovember  1982,  the government unified the exchange rates  and  began  to 
adjust the rate by daily devaluations.  Durin&  1982,  the value of the peso 
fell by  almost 400  percent  (Area Handbook.  1985);  since then inflation has 
continued to erode the real value of the peso and.  now,  the austral.  Althou&h 
export taxes have varied quite markedly over time,  since mid-1982  (when  they 
were  raised to accompany  the devaluations)  they have  ranged  from  10-15 percent 
on many  processed agricultural products  to 20-25  percent on unprocessed meats 
and  crop exports  (Mielke.  1984).  Recently,  Argentine policy makers  have 
entertained the possibility of moving  from  an agricultural export tax system 
to a  land  tax.  However,  the policy proposal has not yet been  implemented. 
Ar&entina participates in the current round  of multilateral trade ne&otations 
on  agriculture (the Uruguay  Round)  as  a  member  of the Cairns Group.  a  group  of 
13  countries that identify themselves as "nonsubsidizin& agricultural 
exporters".  This  group  has  expressed strong support for an  agreement that 
would  reduce agricultural protectionism,  particularly in industrialized 
countries. 
Brazil 
In the early 1980's Brazil was  the third largest exporter of agricultural 
products  in the world.  It was  the largest exporter of coffee,  the second 
5 larsest exporter of soybeans,  and  the fourth larsest exporter of susar  (Area 
Handbook,  1983).  As  in Arsentina,  asriculture plays  a  significant role in the 
economy:  it accounted for 13  percent of  GDP  in 1984  and  somewhat  over 40 
percent of all export earnings  in 1981.  As  in the case of Arsentina,  the 
importance of total agricultural exports as a  percent of total merchandise 
exports has  declined.  Durins 1964-68,  agricultural exports had  accounted  for 
85  percent of export revenues  (Area Handbook,  1983). 
The  performance of  the agricultural sector has been extremely uneven.  Brazil 
has  successfully diversified away  from  its dependence on  a  sinsle export crop 
at anyone  time  (coffee,  sugar,  or cocoa)  and  has had  some  success at limiting 
its dependence  on  foodgrain  imports  (particularly wheat).  During  the 1970's 
soybeans  replaced the traditional export crops mentioned  above  as  the major 
agricultural  income  earner,  recently accounting for approximately one-third of 
asricultural export eaminss  (Ruff'and Kielke,  1984).  The  dramatic  increase 
in soybean production was  accompanied  by  an equally dramatic  increase in 
Brazil's share of the world  soybean market.  Additionally,  Brazil also has  one 
of the lars  est livestock populatiQns  in the world  and  a  very significant share 
of world beef and poultry trade.  On  the other hand,  the production of  food 
crops,  particularly staples such as  corn,  beans,  and  cassava,  has  tended  to 
stagnate relative to population increases.  Brazil's agriculture has  a 
markedly dual structure:  larse,  commercial  farms  grow  export crops  and  wheat; 
small,  traditional farms  srow corn,  rice, manioc,  and  beans  (de Janvry,  1985). 
Brazil's trade,  exchanse rate,  and agricultural policies have over  time 
provided mixed  blessings  for asriculture.  During the 1950's and  into the 
1960's asricultura was  generally handicapped by policies desisned  to encourage 
import substitution and  industrialization:  tariffs on nonagricultural traded 
goods  were high,  asricultural prices wera held down  with direct price 
6 controls,  the cruzeiro vas overvalued,  and  there ware  only modest  sovernment 
tran8fers to asriculture in the forms  of credit and  fertilizer subsidies.  In 
the 1960's there was  an  open ins-up of the economy  which helped to fuel 
impressive srowth rates for both industry and  asriculture;  however,  the oil 
crisis of 1973-74  produced  a  renewed  interest in import-substitution as  the 
oil import bill rose and  the trade balance deteriorated.  Although 
import-substitution industrialization was  generatly biased against 
asriculture,  the Brazilian government  recognized asriculture's  importance  in 
terms  of providing foreisn exchanse with which to pay for oil  imp~rts and 
service a  growins  foreign debt.  Additionally,  the promotion of sugar 
production for alcohol could,  and  did,  limit Brazil's dependence  on petroleum 
imports.  Thus,  in order to counteract the negative effects on  agriculture of 
currency controls and  adverse terms  of trade,  the Brazilian sovernment has 
provided  farmers  with heavily subsidized production credit since the 1970's. 
The  real value of annual asricultural credit increased sixfold between 1960 
and  1972,  and,  in 1977,  disbursed asricultural credit was  equal  in value to 
the total GDP  of asriculture  (de Janvry,  1985). 
Credit has been  the main asricultural policy instrument.  However,  a  minimum 
price program,  similar to the u.s.  nonrecourse  loan program,  has  also been  in 
effect.  This prosram has had  mixed  success at maintaining real price levels 
and  stabilizins prices throuShout the sector.  Price incentives for wheat,  an 
important  import-substitution crop,  have been extremly favorable. 
Despite the subsidies provided throush credit and,  in some  years,  throush the 
p~ice support proSram8.  Brazil baa also employed  restrictive export policies 
for unprocessed asricultural commodity  exports,  such as  soybean..  These 
policies,  includinc export taxes and  quantitative export restrictions,  tax 
7 producers  and  subsidize consumers  (processors)  of these commodities  by 
depressing  domestic prices relative to traded prices. 
Brazil is a  member  of the Cairns Group  and  a  vocal participant in multilateral 
trade negotiations.  Brazil has been the subject of a  number  of u.s. 
complaints  of unfair trading practices  involving agricultural commodities  over 
the past several years  (Ballenger,  1986). 
Mexico 
For many  years,  due  to the success of the Green Revolution,  agriculture was 
the most  dynamic  sector of the Mexican  economy.  As  in Argentina and  Brazil, 
the sector represents an  important  component  of  GOP  and,  until the revenues 
from  petroleum exports began to swell in the late 1970's,  agricultural 
commodities  were at the top  of  the list of export revenue earners.  However, 
as  in the other two  countries,  the role of agriculture has diminished: 
agriculture's share of· GOP  fell from 15.9 percent in 1960  to 8.4 percent in 
1980;  its share of export earnings fell from  31  percent in 1970  to 9.2 percent 
in 1980  to 5.4  perc~ in 1984  (Roberts  and  Mielke,  1986).  Honetheless, 
coffee still ranks  as Mexico's  second most  important export product  (after 
crude oil),  followed  by  cotton,  tomatoes,  other fresh vegetables and  fruit, 
and  live cattle (Roberts  and  Mielke,  1986). 
A difference between Mexico  and  the other two  countries is the relative 
importance  in Mexico  of agricultural imports.  Mexico's agricultural trade 
balance turned  from positive to negative in 1980  as its export earnings  fell 
and its food  import bill grew.  Mexico's  food  imports grew rapidly throughout 
the seventies  (peaking in 1981)  due  to the failure of per capita food 
production to  increase as fast as population,  per capita income  increases 
8 which  spurred  food  demand,  and  adverse weather conditions.  The  principal 
Mexican asricultural imports  include srains,  oilseeds,  and  dairy products 
(principally non-fat dry milk).  -Although most  imports  come  from  the United 
states, Mexico  has  attempted  to diversify its sources of supply--a policy 
which has  led to increased  imports,  particularly of soybeans,  from  Arsentina 
and  Brazil. 
As  in the case of Brazil,  Mexico's  trade,  macro  and  agricultural policies have 
provided both incentives and  disincentives for agriculture.  In the early 
stages of the country's  import substitution industrialization phase,  segments 
of  the agricultural sector benefited from high levels of public  investment  in 
irrigation,  and  the subsidized provision of  improved  seeds  and  other modern 
inputs.  The  government  was  committed  to agricultural growth in order to 
provide  inexpensive  food  and  keep  wages  low  in the srowing urban areas  and  to 
increase asricultural export eaminss to finance  industrialization. 
Accompanying  policies aimed  at modernizins and  commercializins the sector was 
a  price support system aimed  at stimulating the production of and  guaranteeing 
a  market  for  food  crops,  such as  corn,  beans,  wheat,  and,  later,  sorshum and 
oilseeds.  This price support system has,  at times,  provided  favorable  enough 
price incentives  to encourage the production of basic  food  crops by  large 
commercial  farms  in irrigated areas at the expense of export crop  (tomatoes, 
other fruits and  vesetables,  and  cotton)  production. 
The  impressive growth of  the agricultural sector besan to slow noticably in 
the mid-sixties.  The  rate of growth fell from  4.4 percent between 1959  and 
1968  to 2.5 percent in the seventies  (de Janvry,  1985).  The  poorer 
performance has  been attributed to a  number  of factors  including decreased 
public  investment in agriculture,  diminishing gains  from  the Green Revolution, 
9 the failure of guaranteed crop prices to keep pace with inflation.  rising 
input costs.  and  an overvalued exchange rate which implicitly taxed the 
production of tradeable agricultural goods  and  kept  food  imports arttficially 
cheap.  As  in Brazil and  Argentina.  protection was  high in the nonagricultural 
sector.  biasing the internal terms of  trade against agriculture.  By  the late 
seventies.  Mexico  had  become  a  major food  importer. 
The  Mexican oil boom  coincided with growing  concerns with food  security and 
financed  the ambitious  food  self-sufficiency program,  the Mexican  Food  System 
(SAM),  initiated in 1980.  The  program compensated  for the overvalued exchange 
rate with large  increas~s in price supports,  credit and  input subsidies  for 
producers of  import-substitution crops •. The  total cost of subsidies to 
agriculture over three years was  $10.9 billion (de Janvry,  1985).  Although 
the  SAM  program was  successful at increasing production,  the heavy  spending 
contributed to the deterioration of the real value of the peso.  The  financial 
crisis of 1982  and  the resulting austerity plans forced Mexico  to  abandon its 
food  self-sufficiency goal. 
Since 1982  there has been a  succession of devaluations  of  the Mexican  peso 
and,  after an intitial tightening,  a  gradual  liberalizing of  import controls 
affecting nonagricultural goods.  Input subsidies to agriculture continue to 
be reduced but remain substantial.  The  agricultural price support  system 
remains  in place and  the government  of Mexico  continues to maintain fairly 
tight control over food  imports.  These policies tend to maintain positive 
nominal rates of protection for some  commodities,  such as  corn and  soybeans; 
although rates for other commodities,  such as wheat  and  sorghum,  have been 
negative in some  years since 1982  (Briefing Book). 
10 Mexico  has  recently joined the General  Alreement  on  Tariffs and  Trade  (GATT) 
and.  therefore.  participates  in the current  round  of  trade negotiations as  a 
member  rather than an observer.  The  country is in the process  of  implementing 
changes  in trade barriers that will bring its trade policy regime  into harmony 
with  GATT  rules.  ego  converting  from  an  import  licensing to tariff system. 
Mexico  is  least inclined.  however.  to relinquish direct government  control 
over  imports  and  exports of basic agricultural commodities  and  is expected to 
proceed most  slowly on  reform of agricultural trade restrictions. 
ANALYTICAL  FRAMEWORK 
The  framework  for this analysis has  its origins  in studies by  Valdez  (1985) 
and  Deardoff  and  stern  (1986).  We  set up  a  partial equilibrium model  with all 
produced  and  consumed  goods  specified in demand  and  supply functions.  The 
model  is developed  for m countries/regions.  i  = 1  to m.  producing  and  trading 
n  goods.  j  =  1  to n.  and  producing additionally a  nontraded  good.  k.  The 
traded  goods  include agricultural goods  (j  = 1 •...•  n-2).  a  composite other 
agricultural good  (j  =  n-1).  and  a  composite nonagricultural good  (j  =  n). 
The  demand  and  supply functions  depend  on all prices  as  delineated below: 
DAij  = OAij (PAij.  PTin.  PHik)  (1) 
DTin  = DTin(PAij.  PTin,  PHik)  (2) 
DHik  = DHik(PAij,  PTin,  PHik}  (3) 
SAij  = SAij(PAij,  PTin,  PHik}  (4) 
STin = STin(PAij,  PTin,  PHik)  (5) 
SHik  =  SHik(PAij,  PTin,  PHik)  (6) 
where  0  and  S  are demand  and  supply equations,  respectively, Pare prices.  A 
denotes  agricultural goods,  T represents  the nonagricultural traded products 
11 either exported or imported.  and  H represents the nontraded  good.  The  model 
excludes wages.  factor rental rates.  and  income.  Farm  input prices are 
included  implicitly in the price of nonagricultural goods  faced  by 
agricultural producers;  likewise,  agricultural prices represent both prices of 
inputs  and  prices of alternative outputs  to nonagricultural producers. 
The  domestic  economy  reaches  an equilibrium when  home  goods  have  an excess 
supply  (IS)  equal to 0  and  when  net traded goods  (including agricultural 
goods)  equal "net capital flows"  (F).  F  is defined as  including capital and 
service accounts  and  accommodating  changes  in international reserves.  For 
country i. 
!SHik •  SHik  - OHik  - 0  (7) 
n  n  n 
i  PijlSij  ..  ~  PijSij  ~  PijOij  - Fi.  (8) 
j ..  l  j-1  j-1 
World  markets clear when  excess  supply of a  good  across all countries is equal 
to zero.  For agricultural  commoditi~s, this occurs when 
m  m  m  z.. ISAij  ..  2. SAij  - 2-OAij  - 0  (9) 
i .. l  i .. l  i ..  1 
for each j, j  - 1  to n  - 1.  For the nonagricultural good  that is traded,  n, 
equilibrium occurs when 
m  m 
~  ISTin ..  ~  STin 
i-1  i-l 
m 
~OTin - 0 
i ..  1 
The  traded price in each country's home  currency is: 
PTij  ..  Ii PWTj 
(10) 
(11) 
where Ii equals home  currency per u.s.  dollar,  PWTj  is the world dollar price 
of  lood j  for all traded j's.  The  exchange rate is assumed  to be exogenously 
determined--an assumption to be relaxed later. 
Various  government policies can place a  wedge  between the world price of  a 
12 traded good  and  the domestic price or implied per unit value of that good. 
(In the model,  we  assume  no  transportation costs or marain markups.)  Consider 
-
the possibility that the home  country affects traded prices  (prices ,faced'by 
producers  and  consumers)  by either imposing  an  ad  valorem subsidy or tax on 
exports or imports.  This has  the effect of modifing equation  (11)  to 
PTij  •  Ei  PWTj  (1 + tij)  (12) 
where tij can be interpreted as  an  export subsidy or import tariff (tij  >  0), 
or export tax or import subsidy (tij  <  0)  and  is assumed  to be exogenous.  If 
the home  country wants  to encourage  (discourage)  exports, it can subsidize 
(tax)  exports  implying  t  >  0  (t <  0).  If the home  country wants  to discourage 
(encourage)  imports,  it can tax (subsidize)  imports  implying  t  >  0  (t < 0). 
A shock to the system--in terms  of a  change in protection in either sector of 
the economy,  in any  country or commodity market--leads to changes  from  base 
values  in quantities produced,  consumed,  and  traded and  world  and  domestic 
prices.  The  system also determines either (1)  changes  in each country's 
balance of trade under the assumption of fixed  exchange rates and  the 
availability of external financing or  (2)  changes  in each country's exchange 
rate under the assumption of floating rates which return all country's balance 
of trade to the initial equilibria.  Thus.  in the second case,  we  are assuming 
that changes  in trade protection can change  currency values depending  on  the 
elasticities of demand  and  supply for traded and  nontraded  goods.  Since the 
elasticities approach does not consider a  world with capital flows,  we  are 
implicitly assuming that the shock  impacts only on  the trade balance and  does 
not induce changes  in capital flows. 
Through  a  series of differentiations and  substitutions  (see Appendix).  we  can 
obtain an expression for changes  in balance of trade  (which equals  changes  in 
net capital outflows)  in terms  of  change.  in protection and  exchange  rate policies,  and  changes  in world price. of both agricultural and nonagricultural 
traded goods: 
('\1  +1{2)  E*  +"\t1  [PWA*  +  (1  +  tA)*l  +'t2  [PW'r*  +  (l +  tT)*l  - F*  (13) 
where  the *'s indicate percentage changes  in variables and  the ~  's are 
parameters  consisting of supply and  demand  elasticities and  the shares of 
agriculture and  nonagriculture in trade.  (For the demand  equations,  the  own 
price elasticities are negative and  the cross price elasticities are positive 
or negative depending  on  whether the products are substitutes or complements. 
The  reverse holds  for the supply equations.  Additionally,  cross price effects 
are negative on  goods  that represent  inputs into the production process,  e.g. 
the nonagricultural good  price may  represent the price of  farm  inputs as well 
as the price of alternative outputs.) 
Under  a  fixed  exchange rate system.  1*-0,  the balance of trade changes  in 
response to  changes  in protection in the agriculture and  nonagriculture 
sectors and  changes  in the world prices of traded goods.  External  financing 
is assumed  to be  forthcoming  to balance the change  in the value of net trade. 
11  In the small  country case  (unilateral changes  in protection do  not  lead to 
world price changes)  agricultural markets  would  be affected  (a)  directly by 
changes  in the country's agricultural protection and  (b)  indirectly by  changes 
in prices of nonagricultural and  nontraded  goods  resulting from  changes  in the 
country's nanagricultural protection.  Additionally,  when  world prices and  the 
trade balance both change  following unilateral liberalization (the large 
country,  fixed  exchange  rate case).  the new  world prices feed back to  domestic 
prices in all countries and affect domestic production and  consumption  and. 
consequently,  trade. 
11  Trade policy changes do  not directly influence capital flows.  but do  so 
indirectly in order to balance the trade account. 
14 
." Under  a  floating exchange rate system,  the country'. currency would  depreciate 
or appreciate following  liberalization until the chanaes  in the .xternal 
imbalance are eliminated,  that is, until 1*.0.  The  change  in protection and 
the ensuing exchange rate change both  dete~ine changes  in domestic prices. 
If the parameters of equation (l3),  ~l and \r2 are positive,  then a  reduction 
in protection leads to a  depreciation of the exchanae rate which offsets,  to 
some  extent,  the negative  impacts  on  domestic prices of a  reduction in 
prQtection levels.  If the agricultural protection levels are initially 
negative and  nonagricultural protection is initially positive,  then a 
reduction of protection can  lead  to a  depreciation which would  reinforce the 
positive impacts  of  liberalization on  domestic agricultural prices. 
The  appendix differentiates the entire system of equations and  derives  reduced 
form  equations for prices and  exchange rates in terms  of the exogenous 
variables,  protection in the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. 
DATA  SOURCES 
Three  types  of data are needed  to develop  the empirical model:  (l) base year 
data,  including quantities supplied,  demanded,  and  traded,  prices,  and 
exchange rates for 1984;  (2)  elasticities,  including own- and  cross-price 
elasticities of  supply and  demand  for agricultural and  nonagricultural 
composite goods;  and  (3)  measures  of protection for agricultural and 
nonagricultural goods. 
Base year data for agricultural supply and  demand  were  obtained  from  the 
Foreisn Agricultural Service,  USDA,  supply and utilization data base.  Country 
GOP  data,  used to calculate other agricultural supplies and nonagricultural 
supplies  (traded and  nontraded),  ware  obtained  from  United Wational Monthly statistics  (Special Table I, Gross  domestic product and net material product 
by kind of economic  activity),  Eurostat Review  (National accounts,  sross value 
added  at current market prices),  and  International Financial Statistics, 
International Monetary Fund.  Trade  flow fisures were  obtained  from 
International Trade 1985-86,  published by the GATT,  Food  and  Asricultural 
Orsanization's Trade Yearbook,  and.  for Latin American  countries,  from  country 
statistical trade yearbooks.  Net trade for each sood  ~s subtracted from 
supply in order to obtain demand.  In cases where  1984  data were unavailable, 
estimates were  made  based  on  the latest information available. 
Elasticities were  obtained  from  several sources.  Price elasticities for 
agricultural commodities  were  compiled.  based on  estimates from  a  number  of 
existing studies,  by the Economic  Research Service  (ERS),  USOA,  for the 
purposes of its asricultural trade liberalization modelins work.  Elasticities 
for nonasricultural 500ds  were  obtained from  Oeardorf and  stern or were 
estimated by  applying the homoseneity conditions to the equations.  All the 
elasticities should be considered medium  term estimates,  that is.  three to 
five years. 
Ad  valorem equivalent rates of protection for nona5ricultural traded 500ds 
were  obtained from Whalley for developed countries and  from  the IHF  for  the 
Latin American  countries.  Asricultural protection rates,  producer and 
consumer  subsidy equivalents  (PSE's  and  eSE's),  were  developed by  ERS.  These 
measures  include estimates of the subsidy equivalents of domestic agricultural 
policies,  such as direct payments  and  input subsidies,  as well as  the effects 
of trade barriers  (ERS).  Where  asricultural PSE's  and  eSE's were unavailable, 
e.timate. of asricultural commodity  protection were  obtained from  Tyers  and 
Anderson. 
16 SIMULATION  MODEL  ABO  RESULTS 
Although  in this study we  highlight the simulation results for Argentina, 
Brazil,  and  Mexico,  the country coverage consists additionally of the United 
States,  the European Community,  Canada,  Japan,  and  an  aggregate entity that 
represents  the  ROW.  The  agricultural commodities  include wheat,  corn, 
soybeans,  rice,  dairy,  sugar,  beef,  poultry,  and  other agriculture.  The 
"other agricultural traded"  and  "nonagricultural traded"  goods  consist of 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC)  categories 1 
(agriculture,  hunting,  forestry and  fishing)  and  3  (manufacturing  industries), 
respectively.  The  "nonagricultural nontraded"  good  consists of categories  2, 
and  4-9  (mining  and  quarrying,  electricity,  gas,  and  water,  construction, 
wholesale  and  retail trade,  restaurants,  and  hotels,  transport,  storage and 
communication,  finance,  insurance,  and  real estate,  and  community,  social,  and 
personal services). 
The  Arminston-Type  Structure 
A modification of the model  structure is made  to take into consideration gross 
trade rather than net trade for the composite nonagricultural good.  This  is 
particularly appropriate for a  composite good  where  each country is not buying 
and  selling a  homogeneous  commodity.  Consumers  distinguish,  within the 
nonagricultural traded good,  between products which are produced domestically 
and  those that are  imported.  Consumers,  in the decision making  process,  are 
assumed  to determine their expenditures for the agricultural goods,  for each 
nonagricultural traded product depending  on  country/region of origin (one 
product  from  each country),  and  the nontraded good.  By  treating the 
nonagricultural domestic  and  imported products as  imperfect substitutes,  we 
are able to  account  for bilateral trade flows.  (For more  details on modeling 
17 bilateral trade flows  within the SWOPSIH  framework,  see Dixit and  Ron ins  en 
(1987». 
Three other modifieations are made  to the seneral framework  for simulation 
purposes.  First,  the quantities supplied of  livestoek and  dairy enter the 
feed  demand  equations with elastieities based on  the shares of feed used  in 
livestoek and  dairy relative to total usage.  Thus,  the derived demand 
funetions  for  feed refleet both priee and  teehnieal relationships  (Roningen, 
pp.  3  and .).  Seeond,  beeause PSE's  and  eSE's are not available for ROW,  we 
set the world-to-domestie priee transmission elastieity for this resion at 
.3.  This  assumption mitigate. the  impaets  on  ROW  (and  of  ROW  on  world 
markets)  following  liberalization in the other eountries.  Third,  we 
distinsuish between eonsumer  and  produeer priees sinee the PSE  for a 
partieular eommodity  does not neeessarily equal  (the absolute value of)  the 
eSE  for that eommodity.  PSE's also  inelude the effeet of produeer support 
programs  that do  not direetly affeet eonsumers  (ERS,  1987),  while eSE's 
typieally eapture the effeets only of those prosrams  that direetly affeet the 
priee eonsumers  pay relative to the world priee. 
Liberalization Seenarios 
Five model  simulations were  eondueted to aseertain the potential impaet of 
trade liberalization on  the three Latin Ameriean  eountries and  their roles  in 
asrieultural trade.  In eaeh simulation,  the entire amount  of proteetion was 
removed  in order to estimate an upper bound  on the effeets of 
liberalization.~1  While  the results emphasize  the effeets on  the agrieultural 
~I Sinee the measure. of asrieultural proteetion do  not aeeount  for  the 
effeets of supply eontrol prOSram8,  sueh a. u.S.  aerease set-aside prosrams 
and  dairy supply eontrols  in other eountries,  the  liberalization results 
probably overestimate the impaets of proteetion on world grain and dairy 
priee  •• 
18 sectors,  we  also present estimates of effects of  liberalization on  the total 
trade balance  (exogenous  exchange rate cases),  the exchange  rate  (endogenous 
exchange  rate cases),  and  gross domestic product  (tables l-S).  All results 
are presented in terms  of percentage changes  from  the base-year data which  is 
reported in the appendix. 
Simulations  (1)-(3)  represent trilateral liberalization scenarios which may  be 
of  interest to the Latin American  countries because of pressure to open  their 
economies  and  to reduce domestic price distortions.  This pressure can be 
internal because of budgetary consideration (the country can not afford to 
continue subsidizing producers or consumers)  or external  (International 
Monetary  Fund  or commercial  bank creditors can extend new  loans if Latin 
American  countries'  domestic policies become  more  "efficient").  The 
simulations are as  follows: 
(1)  a  100  percent trilateral liberalization of the agricultural sectors  for 
Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Mexico; 
(2)  a  100  percent trilateral liberalization of all sectors for Argentina, 
Brazil,  and  Mexico; 
(3)  a  100  percent trilateral liberalization of all sectors for Arsentina, 
Brazil,  and  Mexico  under the assumption of endogenous  exchange  rates for all 
countries/regions in the model. 
Scenarios  (4)  and  (S)  may  be of  interest to the Latin American  countries  as 
participants in multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of GATT: 
(4)  a  100  percent multilateral liberalization of the agricultural sectors  for 
all countries; 
(S)  a  100  percent multilateral liberalization of all sectors for all countries 
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n.a •• Vot  available because net trade moves  from  zero to nelative or to 
positive.  *. net exporter in base period. 
11  Producer and  consumer prices were constructed by addinl producer and  consumer 
subsidy equivalents to world reference prices.  Chanles  in these prices result 
from chanles  in producer and  consumer  subsidy equivalents and  chanles  in.world 
price that follow liberalization. 



































Table  2--~rilateral liberalization of the agricultural 
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n.a •• Vot available because net trade moves  from zero to negative or to 
positive.  *. net exporter in base period. 
11  Producer and  consumer prices were constructed by adding producer and  consumer 
subsidy equivalents to world reference prices.  Changes  in these prices result 
from changes  in producer and  consumer  subsidy equivalents and  changes  in world 
price that follow liberalization. 


































Table 3--Trilateral liberalization of the agricultural and 
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n.a ••  Bot available because net trade moves  from  zero  to negative or to 
positive.  *.  net exporter in base period. 
11  Producer and  consumer prices were  constructed by adding producer and  consumer 
subsidy equivalents to world reference prices.  Changes  in these prices result 
from  changes  in producer and  consumer  subsidy equivalents and  chan&es  in world 
price that follow liberalization. 
~I Excludes  'other agriculture'. 
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n.a •• Rot available because net trade moves  from  zero  to negative or to 
positive.  *.  net exporter in base period. 
11  Producer and  consumer prices were constructed by adding producer and  consumer 
subsidy equivalents to world reference prices.  Changes  in these prices result 
from  c~~nges in producer and  consumer  subsidy equivalents and  changes  in world 
price that follow liberalization. 
II Excludes  'other agriculture'. 
23 Table 5--Multilateral liberalization of the agricultural and 
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n.a •• Vot  available because net trade moves  from  zero to negative or to 
positive.  *.  net exporter in base period. 
11  Producer and  consumer prices were  constructed by adding producer and  consumer 
subsidy equivalents to world reference price..  Changes  in these prices result 
from  changes  in producer and  consumer  subsidy equivalents and  changes  in world 
price that fallow liberalization. 
~I Excludes  'other agriculture', 
24 In the first .cenario,  Ar&entina,  Brazil,  and  Kexico,  jointly, but  independently 
of oth.r countries,  liberalize their agricultural .ectors.  As  is the caAe  i&l  all 
five scenarios,  removing  protection induces  changes  in domestic production and 
consumption and,  consequently,  imports  and  exports  (fig.  1).  This,  in turn,  may 
influence world prices if the  liberalizing country has  a  large enough  share of 
the world market.  Production and  consumption  in all countries  respond  to these 
new  price signals until a  new  equilibrium is obtained.  (Clearly,  the effects are 
more  intertwined  and  more  difficult to trace when  all countries eliminate 
barriers to trade for all goods  in the model.)  In the exogenous  exchange  rate 
case,  countries'trade balances continue to adjust until all world markets clear 
and  domestic equilibrium conditions for the nontraded good  are met.  Therefore, 
the net  impact  on  internal prices  in Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Kexico  reflect both 
changes  in protection and  resulting changes  in world equilibrium prices.  In the 
endogenous  exchange  rate case,  there are additional pressures.  Hovements  in the 
trade balances  (away  from  initial equilibria)  drive exchange  rate which  continue 
to adjust,  influencing prices,  production,  and  consumption,  until the initial 
trade balances are restored  (in domestic  currency units)  and  the other 
equilibrium conditions are met. 
Trilateral Agricultural Liberalization versus Trilateral Total Liberalization 
The  results suggest that trilateral liberalization of  the agriculture sector 
would  have quite minor  impacts  on  world  commodity  prices  (table 1).  Soybean 
prices decline close to 2 percent as  Argentina  and  Brazil increase exports 
following  the removal  of producer taxes  and  consumer  subsidies.  On  the other 
hand,  world dairy and  beef prices rise 3.7  and  3.4 percent mainly because of the 
increased Kexican  import demand  following  removal  of protection of these 
commodities.  Although world price changes  are small,  there are substantial 
changes  in internal agricultural prices for most of the commodities  and 
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... -_  ... ...--.- -- - _.  ..--substantial ehanges  in quantities demanded  and  quantities supplied within the 
three Latin eountries.  Liberalization eliminate. the export taxes plaeed on  all 
Argentina'. eommodity  exports resulting in internal priee inereases of,  in many 
eases,  elose to  30  pereent.  In Brazil,  produetion subsidies on  wheat  are removed 
resulting in a  large produeer priee deelines,  while  removing  taxes  on  produetion 
of other eommodities  sueh as eom,soybeans,  and  beef results  in internal priee 
inereases.  Mexieo's  domestie  eommodity  priees deeline substantially in most 
eases  following  removal  of produeer subsidies. 
There are notieeable ehanges  in foreign exehange earnings  (or eosts)  from 
agrieul~ural trade following  liberalization.  Argentina and  Brazil's net 
agrieultural export eaminings  (from the eight disaggregated eommodities  in the 
model)  inerease 57  pereent and  13  pereent,  respeetively,  eompared  to the base 
period.  Both eountries'  total trade balanees also  improve--Argentina's 
eonsiderably more  than Brazil's due  to the dominanee  of these agrieultural 
exports among  Argentina's total exports.  Mexieo's  imports of the eight 
eommodities  inerease over 600  pereent.  However,  the model  indieates that exports 
of Mexieo's "other agrieultural good",  whieh would  inelude fruits and  vegetables, 
eotton and  eoffee would  also  inerease substantially.  Argentina's agrieultural 
domestie produet inereases about  7 pereent  following  agricultural trade 
liberalization,  but total GOP  changes  are very small  in all three countries. 
The  second seenario is a  100  pereent trilateral liberalization of the 
agrieultural and  nonagrieultural seetors  (table 2).  Removal  of proteetion of  the 
nonagriculture seetors benefits the agricultural seetors.  Agricultural export 
earnings  and  agricultural domestie produet inerease in Argentina and  Brazil more 
than the increase generated in seenario  (1).  However,  with  relatively low 
cross-price elasticities between the two  seetors,  the differences between 
seenarios  (2)  and  (1)  are relatively small in terms of the 
27 results for agriculture.!/  Because all three countries are bighly protective 
of their nonagricultural traded goods  sectors.  removins protection of the 
nonagriculture sector results in substantially higher demand  for  imports  and 
considerable deterioration of the trade balances.  Total GOP  changes  are 
negligible. 
Trilateral Liberalization with Fixed Exchange  Rates  versus Trilateral 
Liberalization with Floating Exchange  Rates 
Scenario  (3)  simulates trilateral liberalization of the agricultural and 
nonagricultural sectors with endogenous  exchange rates for all eight 
countries/regions  in the model  (table 3).  Since Argentina.  Brazil.  and Mexico 
are the only three countries  liberalizing.  there is pressure  {as  indicated in 
scenario  (2)]  on  their trade balances  to deteriorate.  To  counter the pressure 
on the trade balances.  the three countries'  exchange rates  (Austral.  Cruzado. 
and  Peso)  depreciate by 9.  16  and  24  percent.  respectively.  The  lower value 
of these currencies are associated with higher Argentine and  Brazilian 
internal prices but  lower prices in other countries'  currencies.  The  lower 
foreign currency prices encourage  foreign demand  for Argentine  and Brazilian 
agricultural exports while higher domestic prices encourage  increases  in 
domestic production and  decreases  in domestic  consumption.  Argentina and 
Brazil.  therefore.  increase their foreign exchange earnings  on  the 
agricultural goods  sp~cified in the model  by 81  and  187  percent. 
respectively.  These  increases are considerably more  than those  found  in the 
fixed  exchange rate case.  Likewise.  Mexico'S agricultural trade balance 
}/ To  our knowledge.  there are no  e.timates of cross-price elasticities 
between our commodity  set and nonagricultural commoditie..  Since some 
nonagricultural commodities  are inputs  into the agricultural production 
process  and  agricultural products are inputs into proce.sed food 
(nonagricultural goods  in our model).  there should be negative cross-price 
elasticitie..  We  chose small numbers.  zero to -0.20.  such that the 
homogeneity conditions were met.  On  the demand  side.  there also may  be  some 
substitution. 
28 deteriorates  [as  in scenario  (2»)  but considerably le.s than in scenario  (2). 
The  impact. of  liberalization on agriculture domestic product are considerably 
more  favorable  in tbe endogenous  excbange rate case than in tbe fixed  exchange 
rate case for all tbree countries. 
Tables  2  and  3  also allow comparison of tbe world  commodity  price impacts 
under fixed and  floating rates following trilateral Liberalization.  The 
results indicate tbat floating rates could  lead to  lower  commodity  prices, 
particularly for some  commodities  in which  Argentina and/or Brazil are major 
exporters such as wheat,  soybeans,  sugar,  and  poultry.  In otber cases  (rice, 
beef,  and  dairy),  price impacts are positive  (as  in the fixed rate case)  but 
smaller than in the fixed rate case. 
The  Armington-type  framework  allows us  to discern that nonagricultural exports 
and  imports both increase for all three countries.  Exports of nonagricultural 
goods  (as well as agricultural goods)  expand  in response to the currency 
depreciations.  The  exchange rate cbanges pressure imports  to decline because 
they  increase relative prices of  foreign to domestic products.  However,  tbe 
. removal  of  import tariff and  nontariff barriers more  tban offsets the exchange 
rate depreciation so that import prices are actually lower  than in the base 
period,  and  therefore,  imports  increase.  The  value of  the trade balance does 
not change  in this scenario because of  the floating  exchange rate. 
Related  to the expansion in the nontraded goods  sector, nonagricultural 
domestic product rises approximately 5,  13,  and  22  percent for Argentina, 
Brazil,  and  Mexico,  respectively.  Due  to improvements  in both agriculture and 
nonagricultural product,  total GDP  increases in the three countries equal  7, 
14,  and  22  percent,  respectively.  Thes. are substantial improvements  in GDP 
over those found  in the fixed excbange rate ca.e. 
29 ~rilateral Liberalization of Agriculture versus Multilateral Liberalization of 
Asriculture  <Fixed  Exchange  Rates) 
Contrasting scenarios  (l)  and  (4) -allows  us  to compare  the implications of 
agricultural liberalization when  the three countries act alone  (table l) with 
those when  they act in consort with other trading partners and  competitors 
(table 4).  In both scenarios,  exchange rates are held constant under  the 
assumption that the agriculture sector is too small to affect exchange  rates. 
~e agricultural sectors of all three countries perform better under multi-
than trilateral liberalization.  Multilateral liberalization leads to 
significant price increases at the world  level in most markets  as  industrial 
countries reduce producer subsidies and.consumer taxes.  ~ese price increases 
feed back  into the agricultural sectors of Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Mexico  as 
higher domestic prices than in the trilateral liberalization case  (or,  in the 
case of Mexico,  smaller price declines than in the trilateral case). 
Increases  in agricultural export earnings are considerably larger in Argentina 
and  Brazil than in the trilateral liberalization case;  and  increases  in 
Mexico's agricultural imports  are smaller or imports decline.  In all three 
countries,  multilateral liberalization benefits agricultural domestic product 
more -than trilateral liberalization. 
~e difference between  the two  scenarios is most profound  in the case of 
Brazil.  ~rilateral liberalization is a  mixed blessing for Brazil's 
agricultural producers:  following  some  price gains  and  some  price declines, 
Brazil's agricultural product is little changed.  However,  following 
multilateral liberalization most price changes  are postive  (from the 
perspective of producers)  and agricultural export revenue  and  domestic product 
show  substantial gains. 
30 
-. Trilateral Liberalization of Asricultural and  Bona&ricultural Sectors versus 
MUltilateral Liberalization of both Sectors  (Endo&enous  Excban&e  Rates) 
A key difference between scenario  (3),  in which  the three countries undertake 
total liberalization and  allow their currencies  to float  (as do  all other 
countries),  and  scenario  (5),  in which all other countries  liberalize and  all 
currencies float,  is the impact on world prices.  When  the three countries 
liberalize jointly but  independently of the rest-of-the-world there is 
downward  pressure on most  commodity  prices--a result largely of  increased 
exports  from  Argentina and  Brazil  (table 3).  The  currency depreciations 
stimulate these countries'  exports beyond  levels achieved  following  removal  of 
protection.  In the multilateral liberalization  s~enario, world  commodity 
price impacts  are,  except for soybeans,  positive (table 5).  This  follows  from 
contractions  in excess  supply and  expansions  in excess  demand  in most  of the 
rest of the world. 
Argentina's  and  Brazil's agricultural sectors undergo  a  greater expansion  in 
the multilateral compared  to the trilateral liberalization scenario.  Foreign 
exchange  earnings  from net agricultural exports  improve  significantly more  in 
the multilateral than in the trilateral case.  particularly for Brazil. 
Agricultural product increases  in both cases.  but relatively more  in the 
multilateral case. 
Another  interesting difference in results of the two  scenarios is the exchange 
rate impact.  In the trilateral liberalization case  the pressure on 
Arsentina's currency is to depreciate.  This  is because  removal of 
n~nagricultural protectionism in Arsentina would,  in the fixed rate case,  lead 
to a  deterioration of the total trade balance.  However,  in the multilateral 
liberalization case.  agricultural export value increases so significantly that 
31 the exchange  rate must appreciate slightly in order to restore the trade 
balance to tbe initial equilibrium. 
Multilateral Liberalization of A&riculture  versus Multilateral Liberalization 
of A$riculture and  Hona&riculture 
As  in the case of multilateral liberalization of  the agricultural sectors 
(scenario .). multilateral liberalization of the agricultural and 
nonagricultural sectors with endogenous  exchange  rates places upward  pressure 
on  all world  commodity prices except soybean prices  (table 5).  Price 
increases result.  as discussed before.  from  the removal  of producer subsidies 
and  consumer  taxes  in the industrial countries.  Botb scenarios result in very 
similar price chanses.  witb the largest differences  found  in soybean and  rice 
prices.  Soybean prices change more  in scenario  (5)  than in scenario  (4) 
because of  the depreciation of the Brazilian currency  (see discussion of 
scenario 3).  The  larger rice price chanses  follows  from  the appreciation of 
the  ROW  currency.  The  ROW  contains  the world's  largest rice traders.  When 
world agricultural trade is liberalized.  the  ROW  moves  from  a  net  import  to 
next export position in rice trade.  When  all sectors are liberalized and 
exchange  rate changes  follow,  ROW  agains  changes  from  a  net  import  to net 
export position but exports  are  lower  and.  consequently.  world prices higher 
than in the previous case. 
Multilateral liberalization of all sectors  leads  to the most  significant 
increase in net agricultural exports for Brazil.  It also produces  the  least 
negative  impact on Hexico's  import bill for grains.  oilseeds.  and  livestock 
products.  The  value of Argentina's agricultural export revenues  increases 
slightly less than in the multilateral agricultural liberalization scenario 
due  to the slight appreciation of the Argentine currency.  Agricultural 
32 
.' product and  total GOP  changes  are also more  favorable  for Brazil and  Mexico  in 
the total trade liberalization scenario than in the agricultural 
liberalization scenario,  while domestic product  impacts  for Argentina are· very 
similar for  the two  scenarios. 
SUHMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
In the current round of multilateral trade negotiations  (the Uruguay  Round) 
the agriculture talks are of great interest to both developed  and  developing 
countries.  Although  a  number  of developing countries have  expressed strong 
support for  liberalization of agricultural trade in the industrial world,  it 
is still unclear if and  how  developing countries will participate in a 
negotiated agreement on  agriculture and·what  the benefits of participating 
would  be  to these countries.  A key  issue for all countries concerned with 
agricultural trade liberalization is the interaction between exchange rate 
policy and  agricultural policy.  Although exchange  rate policy is not within 
the  domain  of  GATT  negotiations,  countries recognize that autonomous  exchange 
rate movements  in a  floating rate world  can affect world  and  domestic 
commodity  markets  as profoundly  a~ negotiated policy changes.  Furthermore, 
developing  count~ies have continued to manage  their exchange  rates often as  a 
form  of commercial  trade policy.  Thus,  the interaction of exchange  rate and 
agricultural policy is of particular concern to developing  countries and  with 
respect to developing country issues  in the negotiations. 
In this paper we  have  looked at the interaction of protection and  exchange 
rate policy with the use of a  world  trade  liberalization simulation model.  In 
the model,exchange rate movements  result from  trade liberalization as  the 
mechanism  by which  trade balance equilibria are restored.  The  simulation 
excercises are designed to help assess the  impacts  on  three developing 
countries  (Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Mexico)  of trade liberalization with fixed 
33 exchange  rates versus  trade and  exchange rate liberalization.  They  are 
designed also to assess the benefits to these countries of multilateral 
liberalization versus  liberalization undertaken jointly but independently of 
other CATt  members. 
The  simulations  led to several general conclusions.  First.  When  trade 
liberalization is accompanied  by  exchange  rate liberalization.  there are 
substantial benefits to the three developing countries over those  found  when 
trade is liberalized with fixed rates. particularly for agriculture.  The 
results for all three countries  indicate substantial improvements  in their net 
trade balances for agriculture and  in agricultural and  total CDP  in the 
floating rate case over the fixed rate case.  It should be noted that the most 
important consequence of total  <rather than agricultural)  liberalization for 
these countries'  agricultural sectors is the resulting exchange rate 
movements,  not the  immediate  impacts of reducing protection in the 
nonagriculture sector. 
Second.  multilateral liberalization is generally more  favorable  for  the 
agricultural sectors of Argentina.  Brazil.  and  Mexico  than trilateral 
liberalization.  Multilateral actions  lead to  larger gains  (or smaller  losses) 
in agricultural trade balances  and  larger gains  in domestic products.  These 
gains are associated with the  increases  in world prices that follow 
liberalization in industrial economies. 
Third.  what  appear to be relatively small changes  in commodity prices 
following  liberalization at the world  level could.  nonetheless.  be associated 
with significant market adjustments  in individual countries.  Also.  there are 
some  key differences  among  the three developing countries that account  for 
34 different internal impacts.  Argentina's agricultural economy  is large 
relative to the rest of the economy.  it is export-oriented.  and  traditionally 
taxed by  government agricultural,  trade.  and  exchange  rate policy.  Thus. 
agricultural  liberalization is very favorable  for  the agriculture sector and, 
due  to the relative size of the agriculture sector,  for the economy  as  a 
whole.  Total  liberalization and  exchange rate liberalization further 
contribute to the well-being of  the agricultural sector.  Brazil's agriculture 
is important but considerably smaller relative to  the rest of the economy  than 
Argentina's,  it produces  a  mix  of  commodities  in which it is both an  important 
exporter and  importer.  and  policy taxes  some  producers  and  subsidizes others. 
Consequently,  trilateral agricultural liberalization is a  mixed  blessing for 
its agricultural sector producers and  has relatively minor economy-wide 
impacts.  Brazil's agricultural sector gains markedly more  from multilateral 
liberalization of agriculture as  the world price increases are relayed back to 
domestic  producers offsetting or mitigating producer price declines that 
follow removal  of producer support.  Mexico's agricultural sector is also 
considerably smaller than Argentina.  it is a  net  importer of most  agricultural 
commodities  (except several not modeled  explicitly)  but close to 
self-sufficient in some,  and  agricultural policy has  tended  to support 
producers.  Consequently,  agricultural liberalization leads to a  marked 
increase in agricultural  imports  (accompanied  by  an  increase in some 
agricultural exports),  and  has  insignificant implications for agricultural and 
total GOP.  However,  the exchange rate depreciation that follows 
liberalization of trade in Mexico's highly-protected.nonagriculture sector has 
quite favorable  implications for agricultural and  total GOP. 
Finally,  the  limited results presented here based on  a  highly-aggregated 
model.  have underscored the need  for a  better understanding and  better 
3S .stimates of the quantitative links between  the asricultural and 
nonagricultural sectors of both developed  and  developing economies  in order to 
determine the outcomes  of trade negotiations  in a  dynamic  and  interrelated 
world  economy. 
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38 APPENDIX 
Derivation of  Reduced  FOt~ Equations 
To  determine the  impact of small changes  in the system for a  single countt"y, 
ego  unilatet"al  changes  in protection,  text equations  (1)  through  (10)  and  (12) 
are differentiated.  One  agricultut"al  good  is assumed  for purposes of 
exposition.  Also,  the country demarcation  i  is initially dropped  for 
notational ease.  The  superscipt *  indicates percentage changes. 
DA*  = m PA*  +  m PT*  +  m PH*  (A1) 
A  T  H 
DT*  = n  PA*  +  nTPT*  +  ~PH*  (A2) 
A 
DH*  =  r  PA*  A  +  rTPT*  +  rHPH*  (A3) 
SA*  = e  PA*  +  eTPT*  +  eHPH*  (A4) 
A 
ST*  = f  PA*  +  fTPT*  +  fHPH*  (AS) 
A 
SH*  =  g  PA*  +  gTPT*  +  gHPH*  (A6) 
A 
where  the m's,  n's and r's represent demand  elasticities and e's, f's and  g's 
represent supply elasticities with respect to domestic prices. 
Differentiatlon of equation  (12),  an  identity,  yields 
PT*  = E*  +  PWT*  +  (1  +  tT)*  (Al) 
and 
PA*  = E*  +  PWA*  +  (1  + tA)*  (AS) 
where  we  distinquish the nonagricultural good  (tT)  and  the agricultut"al  good 
(tA)  policy wedges. 
To  determine  changes  in price of  the home  good,  we  substitute equations  (A3), 
*  *  (A6),  (A7),  and  (AS)  into the differentiated equation  (7),  SH  - DH  = 0, 
PH*  = -[(rA"- gA)/(rH - gH)1  [E*  +  PWA*  +  (1  +  tA)*l 
-[Crt - gT)/(rH - ~)1 [E*  +  PWT*  +  (1  +  tT)*1  (A9) 
The  home  good  price,  therefore,  is  influenced by  changes  in the exchange rate, 
trade policy,  and  world prices of agricultural and nonagricultural  goods" 
39 More  specifically,  if the differences between the cross price elasticities of 
demand  and  supply  [erA - gAl  and  (rT - gT)l  are positive,  then a 
depreciation of  the home  currency,  an  increase in world prices,  or an  increase 
in protection would  place upward  pressure on  the price of the home  good. 
The  next step is to differentiate the net trade equation  (8): 
$l(SA* +  PA*)  - e2(DA*  +  PA*)  + 93(ST* +  PT*)  -e.(DT*  + PT*)  ..  F*  (AlO) 
where  ~l (e2)  is the share of  the value of  supply  (demand)  for agriculture 
and  ~3 (~4) is the  share of  supply  (demand)  for nonagriculture relative to 
the value of net trade.  By  substituting from equations  (AI),  (A2),  (A4), 
(AS),  (A7)  - (A9)  into  (AlO) ,  we  obtain an expression for  changes  in balance 
of  trade  in terms  of changes  in trade and  exchange rate policies,  and  changes 
in world prices of both agricultural and  nonagricultural traded goods 
(equation 13  in text): 
(ill  +1\2)  E*  + III  [PWA*  +  (1  +  tA)*)  + 1\2  [PWT*  +  (1  +  tT)*l  ..  F* 
where 
\\1 = 81(1+eA)  - &2(1+mA)  +&3fA - ~4nA-[(rA-gA)f(rH - gT») 
[eleH- e2~+  83fH- 4nH) 
and 
1\'2  =  9le - e2m  +e3(1+f  )-~4(1+n )-[(r -g )f(r -g  ») 
T  T  T  T  TT  HH 
[~leH- 82~+  8.3fH- d4nH) 
(All) 
Next,  we  relax the assumption of  a  representative country and,  instead,  we 
assume  there are  two  countries  and  three goods  (an agricultural good,  a 
nonagricultural good,  and  a  nontraded good).  The  following  equations 
illustrate the  implications of bilateral changes  of protection in this 
40 framework.  For countries 1  and  2: 
(1\ 11  + 1\12)El*  + \tl1(PWA*  +  (1  +  tAl)*)  +  \\12(PWT*  +  (1  +  tTl)*) 
= Fl*  (A12) 
(1\21  + TI22)E2*  + U21(PWA*  +  (1  +  tA2)*)  +  T\22(PWT*  +  (1  +  tT2)*) 
=  F2*  (A13) 
Again,  we  can  examine  the  two  extreme possibilities:  allowing capital flows  to 
change or allowing  the exchange rate to float.  In the fixed  exchange  rate 
case,  with F1*  +  F2*  = 0  by definition,  equations  (A12  and  A13)  reduce  to: 
112[\\,11 -l\12)PWA*  +  (,,21 -It'22)PWT*  + T11(1  + tAl)*  - \\,12(1  +  tA2)* 
+ \("21(1  +  tT1)*  - ~  22(1  +  tT2)*1  =  Fl*  (AU) 
If country 1  liberalizes relatively more  than country 2  and  assuming  no 
changes  in world price,  then country 1  experiences  a  deterioration of  the 
trade balance and,  consequently,  requires  larger capital  inflows.  In the 
floating  exchange  rate case,  with E2*  = - (l/!lE2)El* by definition,  equations 
(A12  and  A13)  reduce  to: 
-lIrl[1\ll -'1\12)  PWA*  +  (\\21 - ~22)PWT* +  1\11(1+tAl)* - \\12(1  +  tA2)* 
+ \\  21(1  + tT1)*  - \,\22(1  + tT1)*1  = E1*  (AlS) 
where  ('1 = 1\11  + 1\12  +  (1/EIE2) (lT21  +~22).  Again,  if country 1 
liberalizes. relatively more  than country 2  and  assuming no  changes  in world 
prices,  then country 1  experiences  a  depreciation of its currency relative to 
country 2's. 
In equations  (A14)  and  (A1S)  there are three unknown  variables:  changes  in 
world prices of agricultural goods,  changes  in world prices of nonagricultural 
goods,  and  changes  in the trade balance or exchange  rate.  To  complete  the 
system,  the market  clearing conditions  (equations  (9)  and  (10»  need  to be 
differentiated: 
SAlSA1*  +  SA2SA2*  - OA10A1*  - 0A20A2*  = 0  (Al6) 
41 and 
ST1ST1*  +  ST2ST2*  - DTIDT1*  -DT2DT2*  =0  (Al]) 
substituting equations  (Al),  (A4),  and  (A7)-(A9)  into equation  (A16)  and 
equations  (A2),  (AS),  and  (A7)-(A9)  into equation  (A17)  yields 
r 2El*  + (¢ll + ?12)PWA*  +  (fl2l +¢'22)PWT*  +  jlll(l +tAl)* 
+  ¢ 21(1  +  tAl)* + P  12(1+tTl)*  +  122(1 +  tT2)*  ..  0 
and 
('3El*  + (i  11  + ~12)PWA* +  (Q.2l  + i.22)PWT*  + i  11(1 ... tAl)* 
+ J:2l(1  +  tAl)*  +  £12(1 +  tTl)*  + ",{22(1+  tT2)* = 0 
where 
r 2  ..  pJll  + ,12 - (1/E1E2><9'2l  + 122), 
\3  ..  ill + ~12 - (l/EIE2) ("i2l + T22), 
011= SA1(e
Al 
- e  (r 
Hl  Al  - gAl)/(rHl  - gHl»  - DA1(m
Al 
- m  (r  -
HI  Al 
¢12=  SA1(eTl  - eHl(rTl - gTl)/(rHl  - ~l» - DAI(m
Tl - ~  (r  - I  Tl 









/22= SA2(eT2  - eH2(rT2  - gT2)/(rH2  - ~2» - DA2(~2 - ~2(rT2 - gT2)/(rH2  - ~2» 
111=  ST1(fAl  - fHI(rAl  - gAl)/(rHl  - ~l»  - DT1(nAl  - ~(rAl - gAl)/(rHl  - ~l»  , 
1.12=  ST1(fTl - fHl(rTl - gTl)/(rHl  - ~l»  - DT1(nTl - nHl(rTl - gTl)/(rHl  - gHl» , 
~2l= ST2(fA2  - fH2(rA2  - gA2)/(rH2  - ~2»  - DT2(nA2  - nH2(r  A2  - gA2)/(rH2  - ~2»' 
£22= ST2(fT2  - fH2(rT2  - gT2)/(rH2  - ~2» - DT2(nT2  - ~2(rT2 - gT2)/(rH2  -
Under  the assumption of  floating  exchange  rates,  reduced  form equations  can be 
calculated from equations  (A1S) ,  (AlB),  and  (A19): 
El*  = 1Vl(l +  tAl)* +  lV2(1  +  tA2)*  +  1J3(1  +  tTl)* + wi4(1  +  tT2)*  (A20) 
PWA*  =  \JS(l +  tAl)*  +  lI6(l +  tAl)*"  +~(l +  tTl)*  + 1J8(l +  tT2)*  (A2l) 
PWT*  =  W9(1  +  tAl)*  +  1.4.0(1 +  tAl)*  +  Ml(l + tTl)* +  '10112(1  +  tT2)*  (A22) 
where  tJ's are the  reduced  form parameters.  Changes  in the exchange rate,  the 
world prices of agricultural goods,  and  the world prices of nonagricultural 




r Bnd  ~12 are expected to be negative,  while  ~2, ~4, ~7, ~8, ~9, and 
~lO are expected  to be positive.  Reducing  protection relatively more  in 
country 1  than  in country  2  should  cause  a  decline  in the  value  of  country l's 
currency relative to  country 2's and  should  have  a  postive effect on  world 
prices. 
43 Base Data for Simulation Model .  . 
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